Dual-Use Research and Technological Diffusion: Reconsidering the Bioterrorism Threat Spectrum
2011

Reconsidering the Bioterrorism Threat Spectrum

Sample size: 27 publication Evidence: moderate

Author Information

Author(s): Jonathan E. Suk, Anna Zmorzynska, Iris Hunger, Walter Biederbick, Julia Sasse, Heinrich Maidhof, Jan C. Semenza

Primary Institution: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control

Hypothesis

What are the potential bioterrorism threats related to dual-use research in life sciences?

Conclusion

The study suggests that low-tech bioterrorism threats may be more likely than high-tech ones.

Supporting Evidence

  • The study reviewed 27 assessments published between 1997 and 2008.
  • Low-tech bioterrorism methods may be more feasible for terrorists than high-tech methods.
  • Expertise and equipment thresholds were used to assess the threat level of various dual-use research activities.

Takeaway

This study looks at how easy it might be for bad people to use science to create biological weapons, and it finds that simpler methods might be more common than complicated ones.

Methodology

The study reviewed 27 assessments of dual-use research activities and conducted a threat assessment during an expert workshop.

Potential Biases

The study acknowledges potential bias in threat assessments due to the secrecy surrounding intelligence about terrorist organizations.

Limitations

The review focused only on the application of dual-use research by terrorist organizations and did not consider state-sponsored biological weapons programs.

Participant Demographics

The assessments were selected based on literature reviews and interviews with international experts.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

10.1371/journal.ppat.1001253

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