Illusionism, Moore, and Chalmers
2024

Defending Moore's Argument Against Illusionism

publication Evidence: moderate

Author Information

Author(s): Evgeny V. Loginov

Primary Institution: Moscow State University

Hypothesis

Can Moore's original argument effectively counter Chalmers's criticisms of illusionism?

Conclusion

The study argues that the Moorean argument does not achieve the same level of persuasiveness as Moore's original argument for the existence of an external world.

Supporting Evidence

  • The paper argues that the Moorean argument is not as persuasive as Moore's original argument.
  • It discusses the challenges of defending the existence of phenomenal consciousness against illusionism.
  • The author critiques the common-sense assumptions underlying the arguments for realism about consciousness.

Takeaway

The paper discusses whether we can trust our feelings of pain and consciousness, suggesting that some arguments against these feelings might not be as strong as they seem.

Methodology

The paper analyzes philosophical arguments regarding consciousness and illusionism, comparing them to Moore's original argument.

Limitations

The arguments presented may not fully address all aspects of the debate on consciousness and illusionism.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1449314

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