Kantian Perspectives on Embryonic Stem Cell Research
Author Information
Author(s): Bertha Alvarez Manninen
Primary Institution: Arizona State University at the West Campus
Hypothesis
Are human embryos Kantian persons?
Conclusion
The paper argues that human embryos should not be considered Kantian persons from conception, as personhood is tied to the capacity for reason, which is not present in embryos.
Supporting Evidence
- Kant's formula of humanity emphasizes the capacity for reason as the basis for moral consideration.
- Embryos lack the capacity for reason and self-consciousness, which are essential for Kantian personhood.
- The paper argues that treating embryos as persons could undermine the dignity of actual persons.
Takeaway
The study discusses whether human embryos should be treated as people according to Kant's philosophy, concluding that they shouldn't be because they can't think or reason yet.
Methodology
The paper engages in an exegetical study of Kant's works to challenge assumptions about personhood and the moral status of embryos.
Limitations
The paper does not provide empirical data or a clear consensus on the moral status of embryos from a Kantian perspective.
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
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