Detecting Bioterror Attacks by Screening Blood Donors: A Best-Case Analysis
2003

Detecting Bioterror Attacks by Screening Blood Donors

publication Evidence: low

Author Information

Author(s): Edward H. Kaplan, Christopher A. Patton, William P. FitzGerald, Lawrence M. Wein

Primary Institution: Yale School of Management

Hypothesis

Can screening blood donors provide early warning of a bioterror attack?

Conclusion

Screening blood donors for bioterror agents is unlikely to detect an attack earlier than observing symptomatic cases.

Supporting Evidence

  • An attack infecting 100 persons with a noncontagious agent has only a 26% chance of being detected within 25 days.
  • Even with 99.99% specificity, 1,390 false-positive results would occur each year.
  • The cost of screening all blood donations in the U.S. would be $139 million per year.

Takeaway

The study found that checking blood donations for bioterror agents won't help us find attacks faster than just watching for sick people.

Methodology

The study used stochastic models to analyze the probability of detecting a bioterror attack through blood donor screening.

Potential Biases

The study assumes perfect specificity of tests, which may not reflect actual testing conditions.

Limitations

The study's assumptions were overly optimistic, and real-world conditions would likely lead to longer detection times.

Participant Demographics

The study considers the general U.S. population and blood donors.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

10.3201/eid0908.030079

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