Detecting Bioterror Attacks by Screening Blood Donors
Author Information
Author(s): Edward H. Kaplan, Christopher A. Patton, William P. FitzGerald, Lawrence M. Wein
Primary Institution: Yale School of Management
Hypothesis
Can screening blood donors provide early warning of a bioterror attack?
Conclusion
Screening blood donors for bioterror agents is unlikely to detect an attack earlier than observing symptomatic cases.
Supporting Evidence
- An attack infecting 100 persons with a noncontagious agent has only a 26% chance of being detected within 25 days.
- Even with 99.99% specificity, 1,390 false-positive results would occur each year.
- The cost of screening all blood donations in the U.S. would be $139 million per year.
Takeaway
The study found that checking blood donations for bioterror agents won't help us find attacks faster than just watching for sick people.
Methodology
The study used stochastic models to analyze the probability of detecting a bioterror attack through blood donor screening.
Potential Biases
The study assumes perfect specificity of tests, which may not reflect actual testing conditions.
Limitations
The study's assumptions were overly optimistic, and real-world conditions would likely lead to longer detection times.
Participant Demographics
The study considers the general U.S. population and blood donors.
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
Want to read the original?
Access the complete publication on the publisher's website