Agent-Based Bargaining Model in Regular Lattices
Author Information
Author(s): David J. Poza, José I. Santos, José M. Galán, Adolfo López-Paredes
Primary Institution: Social Systems Engineering Centre INSISOC, Valladolid, Spain
Hypothesis
The spatial structure significantly influences the dynamics of the Nash bargaining game in a finite population of tagged agents.
Conclusion
The study shows that the spatial distribution of agents can lead to new persistent regimes in bargaining outcomes that differ from those found in previous research.
Supporting Evidence
- The model extends previous research by incorporating spatial structure into the Nash bargaining game.
- Different persistent regimes can emerge based on the spatial distribution of agents.
- Community structure in interaction networks can hinder the diffusion of strategies.
Takeaway
This study looks at how people make deals when they are arranged in a grid, showing that where you are can change how you negotiate.
Methodology
An agent-based model was used to simulate bargaining in a regular lattice, where agents interact with their neighbors based on their past experiences.
Potential Biases
The model may not accurately represent real-world interactions due to its simplifications and assumptions about agent behavior.
Limitations
The model assumes a fixed population and does not account for dynamic changes in agent interactions over time.
Participant Demographics
Agents are divided into two groups based on tags, with equal representation.
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
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