Encourage or Reject Employee Involvement: Value Creation in Human Resource Management in the AI Era—An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Enterprises and Employees
2024

Encouraging Employee Involvement in HRM with AI

publication Evidence: moderate

Author Information

Author(s): Yang Xiaowei, Yan Shumin, Testoni Ines

Primary Institution: School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai, China

Hypothesis

How do enterprises and employees choose strategies for value co-creation in HRM with AI involvement?

Conclusion

The study finds that cooperation between enterprises and employees is significantly more likely than non-cooperation in the context of AI-driven HRM.

Supporting Evidence

  • The evolutionary game model indicates a convergence towards two equilibrium points: cooperation and active involvement.
  • Enterprises are more sensitive to the benefit distribution ratio than employees.
  • Higher initial probabilities of cooperation and lower costs facilitate the evolution towards cooperation.

Takeaway

This study shows that when companies and employees work together, especially with AI, they can create more value than when they don't cooperate.

Methodology

The study uses an evolutionary game model and numerical simulations to analyze strategic choices in HRM.

Limitations

The model is based on assumptions that may not fully capture real-world complexities, such as employee perceptions and external environmental factors.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

10.3390/bs14121220

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